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Abstract 
 
Identification and quantification of pathogen threats need to be a priority for the Canadian swine 
industry so that resources can be focused where they will be most effective. Here we create a tool 
based on a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) to model the interaction between biosecurity 
practices and the probability of occurrence of four different diseases on Canadian swine farms. 
The benefits of using this novel approach, in comparison to other methods, is that it enables us to 
explore both the complex interaction and the relative importance of biosecurity practices on the 
probability of disease occurrence. 
 
In order to build the BBN we used two datasets. The first dataset detailed biosecurity practices 
employed on 218 commercial swine farms across Canada in 2010. The second dataset detailed 
animal health status and disease occurrence on 90 of those farms between 2010 and 2012. We 
used expert judgement to identify 15 biosecurity practices that were considered the most 
important in mitigating disease occurrence on farms. These included: proximity to other 
livestock holdings, the health status of purchased stock, manure disposal methods, as well as the 
procedures for admitting vehicles and staff. Four diseases were included in the BBN: Porcine 
reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS), (a prevalent endemic aerosol pathogen), Swine 
influenza (SI) (a viral respiratory aerosol pathogen), Mycoplasma pneumonia (MP) (an endemic 
respiratory disease spread by close contact and aerosol) and Swine dysentery (SD) (an enteric 
disease which is re-emerging in North America). 
 
This model indicated that the probability of disease occurrence was influenced by a number of 
manageable biosecurity practices. Increased probability of PRRS and of MP were associated 
with spilt feed (feed that did not fall directly in a feeding trough), not being disposed of 
immediately and with manure being brought onto the farm premises and spread on land adjacent 
to the pigs. Increased probabilities of SI and SD were associated with the farm allowing access to 
visiting vehicles without cleaning or disinfection. SD was also more likely to occur when the 
health status of purchased stock was not known. Finally, we discuss how such a model can be 
used by the Canadian swine industry to quantify disease risks and to determine practices that 
may reduce the probability of disease occurrence. 
 
Keywords: Bayesian Belief Network, disease probability, swine farm, biosecurity. 
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Introduction 
Effective biosecurity strategies need to determine the means by which a pathogen can be 
introduced and transmitted in order to identify major or minor pathogen threats, so that 
prevention measures can be placed where they will be most effective.  
 
In Canada, not enough money, time, and effort have been invested in identifying and quantifying 
transmission risks for important swine pathogens (Desrosiers, 2011). Lack of understanding of 
potential threats has resulted in unsuccessful control efforts and in losses that can jeopardize both 
individual businesses and the swine industry. Outbreaks of Swine influenza virus and Porcine 
Circovirus, for example, have contributed to the considerable reduction in the number of swine 
farms in Canada (Brisson, 2014), while more recently, the emergence of Porcine Epidemic 
Diarrhea (PED) has had considerable economic impact (Paarlberg, 2014) In the past, Porcine 
reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS),  was the most costly pig disease for more than 
two decades, (costing the US swine industry $560 million per year) (Neumann et al., 2005), yet it 
took 20 years to identify that airborne transmission was an important means of spread 
(Desrosiers, 2011).  
 
Here we create a tool, known as a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN), which can be used to 
identify and quantify the probability of disease occurrence in Canadian swine farms. A BBN is a 
probabilistic graphical model which represents a network of nodes connected by directed links 
that represent a probability function (Jensen, 2001). BBN models allow users to make informed 
decisions about a range of possible outcomes using information based on prior evidence (Fenton 
and Neil, 2013). BBNs have previously been used in the veterinary domain, for example, to aid 
disease diagnosis (McKendrick et al., 2000; Seidel et al., 2003; Otto and Kristensen, 2004)  and 
to assess associations between biosecurity practices and disease outbreak (Firestone et al., 2014). 
These studies focused on one specific disease, and BBNs have not, to our knowledge, been used 
to assess the relative impact of biosecurity practices simultaneously on a group of diseases.  
 
BBNs are ideally suited to the statistical analyses of data from complex epidemiological systems 
(McCormick et al., 2013). We chose to design a BBN in this context for two reasons. First BBNs 
provide a method of consolidating evidence in a consistent and mathematically robust manner. 
Unlike more traditional methods of data analysis, they can incorporate a large number of 
predictors and a number of interactions (Fenton and Neil, 2013). They can therefore be used to 
investigate causal relations between events, weigh the consequences of actions and identify 
unintended side effects. Here we highlight the utility of a BBN, in particular how one might be 
used to assess on-farm scenarios and to determine the trade-offs that must be made during 
decision making on any farm operation. Second, an innovative feature of BBNs is that they do 
not require precise probabilities to calculate the outcome and can provide good results even when 
only approximate probabilities are available (Ben-Gal, 2007). This is an advantage to the swine 
industry where precise prior information about emerging disease events is often not available and 
4 
 
because stakeholder opinions (e.g. producers, veterinarians and allied industry personnel) can 
vary widely (Marvin et al., 2010).  
 
Our objectives are to demonstrate the utility of the BBN for evaluating the effectiveness of 
biosecurity practices on disease occurrence, and for evaluating how biosecurity scenarios could 
reduce probability of disease. We discuss the limitations of the approach, based on the amount of 
data available, and we comment on how future data collection could be focused to allow more 
complete analysis and model development. 
 
Method 
In order to build a BBN we used data that detailed 1) the biosecurity practices used on farms 
across Canada and 2) the occurrence of disease on these farms. These data were collected in two 
different ways as described below. 
 
Farm features and biosecurity data 
In spring 2010 a detailed biosecurity survey was conducted by the Canadian Swine Health Board 
(CSHB) to acquire knowledge about the management and biosecurity practices in the Canadian 
swine industry. The survey was conducted at 218 commercial farms that were situated in 5 
regions of Canada ± British Columbia (BC), the Prairies, Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes 
(Table 1). Similar surveys were also conducted at approximately 100 breeder farms and 
approximately 40 boar stud farms. The surveys were completed by trained assessors who were 
Canadian Quality Assurance (CQATM) validators, the majority of whom are practicing 
veterinarians. All assessors attended one of two training session to ensure that all questions were 
asked and recorded in a consistent manner.  
 
The assessor collected the information using a questionnaire containing 145 questions, each with 
approximately five or six categories. Full results of the survey were reported internally to the 
Canadian Swine industry (Canadian Swine Health Board, 2010). Specific findings of the survey 
will not be reported here; rather we will describe how we used the data for BBN construction.  
 
Each survey question was weighted by ten swine industry experts who were members of the 
Canadian Association of Swine Veterinarians (CASV). The criteria were weighted according to 
how important the farm feature or biosecurity practice is for the prevention of any and all 
disease. Each question was given a weight of between 1 and 10 (10 = most important) by each 
expert. The mean weight was calculated and agreed upon by the experts. Thus the expert 
elicitation followed a Delphi style approach, where weights were assigned and later agreed upon 
as a group (O'Hagan et al., 2006). This process occurred at the time of the biosecurity survey 
(before our work began) and we therefore had no input about the method of expert elicitation. 
Any question that scored a mean weight of more than 6 was included in our analysis.  This gave 
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a total of 14 questions (Table S1), which represent 14 biosecurity practices that were 
incorporated into the BBN.  
 
Disease data 
Selection of diseases 
Following discussion with experts at UPEI and CSHB, six GLVHDVHVZHUHVHOHFWHGDVµWHVW¶
diseases for the BBN. They were selected because they were of particular concern to the 
Canadian swine industry. 
Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS virus) (PRRS) ± a prevalent 
endemic disease transmitted via aerosol. 
Swine Influenza (Swine influenza virus) (SI) ± a viral respiratory aerosol pathogen.  
Mycoplasma pneumonia (Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae) (MP) ± an endemic respiratory 
disease transmitted by close contact and aerosol. 
Swine dysentery (Brachyspira hyodysenteriae or novel strains) (SD) ± an enteric disease 
which is re-emerging in Canada. 
Transmissible Gastro-Entiritis (Transmissible Gastro-Entiritis Virus) (TGE) ± a highly 
infectious coronavirus. 
Pleuropneumonia (Actinobacillus Pleuropneumonia) (APP) ± a respiratory bacterial disease 
that is spread by aerosol or direct contact. 
 
Collection of disease data 
A questionnaire was designed to collect information about the occurrence of the six diseases on 
the farms that had taken part in the biosecurity survey in 2010 (Figure S1). The questionnaire 
was administered via email as a Microsoft Word 2007 document and online via the Fluidsurveys 
website in 2013 (Fluidsurveys, 2013). The questionnaire presented the list of six diseases and 
asked three questions: 1) what is the identification number of the farm? 2) what was the health 
status of the farm in 2010 at the time when the biosecurity survey was conducted? 3) were there 
any disease outbreaks on the farm between January 2010 and December 2011? The questionnaire 
was emailed by CSHB researchers to all veterinarians (n=40) who completed the biosecurity 
survey for the 218 farms. The veterinarians were invited to complete the survey for each farm 
within 2 weeks. One reminder email was sent to non-responders after 2 to 3 weeks. Vets were 
instructed that they would receive a payment of $100 for participation. Farm identification and 
precise location of the farm was only known by the veterinarians and was not disclosed to the 
authors. Disease reporting was considered to be accurate because the veterinarians were able to 
consult their records that they made at the time of diagnosis. Data about farm biosecurity 
practices and disease status were collated in one database.  The farm identification number 
allowed us to match anonymously the disease information from our survey with the biosecurity 
information on that farm.  
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BBN construction  
In brief, a BBN is a model which describes the direct dependencies between a set of variables. It 
is represented as a directed acyclic graph, in which nodes (representing variables) are connected 
by arrows that represent directed causal relations. Each node, which has a number of states, 
contains a conditional probability table (CPT), which specifies the conditional probability of the 
node being in a specific state given the state of its parent nodes. The BBN uses Bayes¶ rule to 
calculate the posterior probabilities, thus WKHWHUPµ%D\HVLDQ¶LQ%%1UHIHUVWRWKHSURPLQent role 
RI%D\HV¶UXOHRISUREDELOLW\ Detailed description of Bayesian networks is provided in Jensen 
(2001) and Fenton and Neil (2013). 
 
The BBN model was constructed using the freely available software GeNIe 
(http://genie.sis.pitt.edu/). The following steps were adopted when constructing the BBN models, 
following Fenton and Neil (2013), Chapter 6: 
 
1) Identification of relevant variables; 
2) Creation of the BBN structure; 
3) Identification of variables that require direct links and specification of the relevant 
conditional probability table; 
4) Model validation and testing. 
 
1) Identification of relevant variables; 
There were 14 biosecurity practices that were considered to be the most important for the 
prevention of any and all disease by members of the CASV (Table S1). Thirteen of these were 
LQFOXGHGLQWKH%%1ZKLOHRQH³IUHTXHQF\ZLWKZKLFKFDUFDVVHVDUHUHPRYHGIURPSHQV´ZDV
excluded because all farms adopted the same practice. Two additional nodes were included 
representing region of Canada and farm type since this information is relevant to disease 
occurrence. One additional node represented disease occurrence. 
 
2) Creation of the BBN structure 
A BBN model was built based on a naïve Bayes structure (Figure S2) in which the disease node 
was linked to all other nodes, while none of the other nodes were linked directly to each other. 
This is because each node directly influences disease occurrence. While alternative, non-naïve, 
causal structures that assess node interactions and latent variables (Otto and Kristensen, 2004) 
could be explored, we began with a naïve Bayes approach for simplicity (Fenton and Neil, 2013). 
 
The possible states of each node are listed in Table S1. For example, the central disease node 
represents the probability of disease occurrence; it has five states i.e. one for each disease and 
one for no disease (ND).  Some biosecurity practices had up to eight states in the original 
questionnaire, however, for simplicity we combined states where biologically possible 
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(particularly when information about disease was not available for some states) to improve 
accuracy (Marcot et al., 2006).  
 
3) Identification of variables that require direct links and specification of the CPT 
In the BBN, all except two of the arrows are directed from the disease node (parent node) 
towards the biosecurity nodes (child node). This indicates the direction of inference: the 
occurrence of µDisease 1¶ LQIHUVWKHVWDWHRIµ%LRVHFXULW\SUDFWLFH$¶UDWKHUWKDQRIFDXVality:  
µ%LRVHFXULW\SUDFWLFH$¶FDXVHVµDLVHDVH¶,QIRUPDWLRQFDQIORZLQERWKGLUHFWLRQV, and 
mathematically, a model with arrows running in the opposite direction would be equivalent  
(Fenton and Neil, 2013). There are, however, two reasons for selecting this arrow direction. First, 
the direction allows us to specify a CPT for each biosecurity node, which is conditional on 
disease (rather than specify an unconditional probability table for each biosecurity node). 
Second, the direction allows us to specify an unconditional probability table for the disease node, 
instead of having to specify a probability table for the disease node that is conditioned on all 
biosecurity nodes. 
 
Although it may appear more natural to use the direction from cause to effect, in this case it 
makes sense to use the direction from effect to cause, because the necessary priors are more 
straightforward to elicit (Fenton and Neil, 2013). This is because we can assess records of 
disease on farms and then count the proportions that employ a biosecurity practice. In contrast if 
we sample biosecurity practices, it will be more difficult to then count how many farms get a 
disease. There were two exceptions: the nodes for region and for farm type were parent nodes of 
the disease node. This is because they represent a fixed state for each farm and cannot be altered 
in order to reduce disease occurrence.  
 
Specification of CPTs 
Conditional probabilities were calculated according to %D\HV¶ theorem using the data about 
disease occurrence and biosecurity practices on each farm. For example, we calculated P(a swine 
farm is within 1km| PRRS) ± i.e. the probability of a neighbouring swine farm being within 1km, 
given that a farm has PRRS. Conditional probabilities were input into the CPT of each node. 
Occasionally, some cells of a CPT were 0 when there was a lack of data (e.g. no cases of a 
particular disease in a given region) and for these cases a value of 0.001 was specified, according 
to the accepted Laplace Estimator convention (Witten et al., 2011). While not every cell in a 
CPT must have a non-zero entry (Marcot et al., 2006), we adopted this practice so that none of 
the states would have an µLPSRVVLEOH¶RXWFRPH 
 
Prior knowledge 
We tested two types of priors for the prevalence of each disease.  
1) Informative priors were computed conditional on farm type and region. For example, the 
conditional probability of (PRRS|Farrow to wean farm type), (PRRS|Farrow to finish farm type), 
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and P(PRRS|Finishing farm type) for each region. We did not receive any questionnaires from 
Farrow to wean farms in Ontario, and in this case we assigned equal weights to each disease state 
(uninformative priors).  
 
2) Informative priors were computed conditional on farm type and region and in addition 
incorporated information about the historical health status of the farm (following Gustafson et 
al., 1998; Gustafson et al., 2005). Data about historical health status of the farm came from 
question 2 of our questionnaire, in which the status of each farm was reported as either naïve, 
positive, stable, or not tested. WHFRPELQHGUHSRUWVRISRVLWLYHRUVWDEOHLQWRRQHµSRVLWLYH¶FODVV 
and we excluded any farms that had not been tested. We calculated the conditional probability of 
a positive or negative health status given the region and the farm type. From this we calculated 
the prior odds of health status, which were then multiplied by the likelihood ratio of disease 
prevalence to estimate the odds of disease (for each region and farm type). Odds were then 
converted to normalised conditional probabilities. 
 
The BBN included a switch on/off node. When µRII¶ the BBN used the informative priors 
without information about historical health status and we call this model the BBN without 
history (BBN
-h:KHQVZLWFKHGµRQ¶the BBN used the informative priors which included 
historical health status and we call this model BBN with history (BBN+h).  
 
Model output 
When the BBN was µUXQ¶ it indicated the µsteady state¶ scenario between the biosecurity 
practices and the probability of disease occurrence. Adding evidence to the BBN, by changing 
the probability of the state of one biosecurity practice, resulted in the BBN revising the states of 
the other nodes according to %D\HV¶theorem. Thus changes in the probability for the states at 
one node were reflected in changes in the probability for the states at other nodes.  The relative 
risk (RR) of each disease was calculated by dividing the probability of disease occurrence (with 
HYLGHQFHE\WKHSUREDELOLW\RIGLVHDVHRFFXUUHQFHLQWKHµVWHDG\VWDWH¶ 
 
4) Model validation and testing 
Model goodness of fit 
The goodness of fit of BBN
-h and BBN+h was assessed by inputting information about each farm 
in turn and comparing the predicted disease status with the observed disease status. The BBN 
predicted disease status was interpreted in two different ways as follows. 
  
(i) The disease status of the farm was the disease state with the highest percentage. For example, 
if the disease node indicated 42% PRRS, 35% SI, 7% MP, 6% SD and 10% no disease (ND), 
then the BBN predicted an occurrence of PRRS. Thus, there could only be one outcome (i.e. 
prediction) for each farm.  
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(ii) It is possible that more than one disease can occur on a farm at the same time. To account for 
this, the BBN prediction was based on a threshold value of disease status. The threshold values 
explored were 20, 30, 33, 40, 50 and 60%.  If the threshold were any of 20, 30 or 33%, then for 
the scenario described in (i) above, the BBN predicted two diseases: PRRS (42%) and SI (35%). 
A threshold of 40% would predict one disease: PRRS. A threshold of 50% would predict no 
outcome. Note that the number of outcomes changes according to the chosen threshold.  
 
We used the observed and predicted probability of disease occurrence on each farm to calculate 
the accuracy (percentage of correctly classified outcomes), number of predicted outcomes, 
sensitivity, positive predictive value (PPV) and f-measure of the BBN. The f-measure, which is a 
weighted average commonly used to assess classification accuracy = 2*((PPV*sensitivity) / 
(PPV+sensitivity)) (Powers, 2011). These calculations were made using the full dataset of 90 
farms for training, and also using 10-fold cross validation (using 90% of the data for training and 
10% for testing) in the data mining software WEKA (Hall et al., 2009). 
 
Model scenario analysis 
The influence of biosecurity practices under different scenarios was assessed using the BBN 
described previously. Firstly, we assessed how the state of each biosecurity practice 
independently altered the probability of disease. To do this, the state of each biosecurity practice 
was altered in turn (i.e. setting one state to 100% at a time) and the probability of disease was 
recorded. We then calculated the relative risk (RR) of each disease compared to the steady state 
BBN; for example, a change in the probability of PRRS from the steady state of 15% to 18% 
equals a RR of 1.2. 
 
Secondly, in order to demonstrate a key strength of the BBN approach, we assessed how 
combinations of biosecurity practices altered the probability of disease. To do this, we selected a 
few biosecurity practices that tended to result in the greatest degree of change (increase or 
decrease) in RR for the various diseases. We then altered the state of those biosecurity nodes 
simultaneously and recorded the probability of disease. 
 
We compared the BBN approach with the results from a logistic regression using presence or 
absence of disease as the outcome of interest. It was not possible to complete a multinomial 
analysis because there was not sufficient data about each disease.  
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Results 
 
Farm health status and disease occurrence 
A total of 20 veterinarians responded to the disease questionnaire, and provided information 
about 116 farms (96 commercial, 15 breeding and 5 boar farms). Further analysis included 90 of 
the commercial farms due to small sample sizes for breeding and boar farms. Six commercial 
farms were excluded because biosecurity information about those farms was not available. The 
commercial farms were either farrow-to-wean (birth to 3 months of age; n=18), farrow-to-finish 
(birth to six months of age; n=40) or finisher farms (3 to 6 months of age; n=32) (Table 1). 
 
Questionnaire responses (question 2) indicated that the health status of the majority of farms was 
known and that most were naïve for the diseases included (Table 2a). Responses to question 3 of 
our questionnaire indicated that of the 90 farms, 35 had at least one disease occurrence between 
January 2010 and December 2011. There were a total of 51 disease occurrences (Table 2b); 22 
farms reported one occurrence of disease, 10 farms reported two and three farms reported three. 
There were no cases of TGE and one case of APP and so these diseases were excluded from all 
further analysis. Remaining analysis focused on 50 disease occurrences, which were PRRS 
(32%), SI (42%), MP (18%) and SD (8%). 
 
BBN steady state 
The steady state of BBN
-h was 12% PRRS, 17% SI, 9% MP, 5% SD and 58% ND (Figure 1). 
The steady state of BBN+h was 16% PRRS, 16% SI, 12% MP, 2% SD and 54% ND. Inclusion of 
prior information about the health status of a farm tended to LQFUHDVHWKHµVWHDG\VWDWH¶
probability of PRRS and MP, and decrease the probability of SD and ND, while having little 
influence on SI.  
 
Preliminary assessment of the data suggested that the region node of the BBN might have a 
misleading influence on the BBN predictions. This is because the majority of swine farms 
included in the biosecurity survey were situated in the Prairies (n=71, 33%) and Ontario (n=52, 
24%), but we only received disease status information from 16 (23%) and 8 (15%) farms in these 
provinces respectively. In contrast, we received information from 95% of the 20 farms in BC and 
so the disease prevalence data are heavily skewed by these inputs. We decided to re-assess the 
model by excluding the region node. We now use the subscripts BBN+r and BBN-r when region 
was included or excluded respectively.  The probability of disease in the steady state of BBN
-h-r 
was 15% PRRS, 20% SI, 8% MP, 4% SD and 53% ND.  The steady state of BBN+h-r was 17% 
PRRS, 18% SI, 12% MP, 1% SD and 52% ND. In comparison, the disease data received for each 
type of farm appeared to be a representative sample of the farms that were included in the 
biosecurity survey: we received responses from 30% of farrow-to-wean farms, 48% of farrow-to-
finish farms and 43% of finisher farms. The farm type node thus remained in the BBN. 
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BBN goodness of fit 
We compared the fit of BBN
-h+r, BBN-h-r, BBN+h+r and BBN+h-r. 
 
Comparison of model predictions that were based on the state with the highest percentage in the 
disease node, showed that the most accurate models were BBN
-h+r and BBN-h-r (figure 2). These 
models generated an accuracy of 67% for BBN
-h+r and 65% for BBN-h-r using the full dataset. 
Ten-fold cross validation resulted in a more honest estimate of 48% of occurrences correctly 
classified using BBN
-h+r and 50% using BBN-h-r.  
 
When we used a threshold value to make predictions (based on the entire dataset), model 
accuracy increased as the threshold value increased (Figure 2). At a low threshold (20%) the 
models predicted between 146 and 163 outcomes (Figure 3) with an accuracy of between 50 and 
60%. A threshold of 50% generated an accuracy of between 67 and 74% and predicted between 
83 and 97 outcomes. BBN
-h+r was the most accurate up to the threshold of 40%, while BBN-h-r 
was the most accurate at 50% (and above), with 75% of occurrences correctly classified, 
although it only predicted a total of 83 outcomes (the full dataset contained 105 outcomes).  
 
The models with the greatest f-measures (based on the state with the highest percentage in the 
disease node) were BBN
-h+r and BBN-h-r (figure 4). The f-measure of each model increased with 
increasing disease node status threshold (Figure 4). The model with the highest f-measure tended 
to be BBN
-h+r. At the 50% threshold, the f measure of BBN-h+r and BBN-h-r did not vary 
considerably (0.706 and 0.700 respectively).  
 
The model that was most accurate, predicted the number of outcomes and had the greatest f-
measure varied according to the threshold value. However BBN
-h+r and BBN-h-r tended to be the 
optimum models according to the goodness of fit results. In light of these results, as well as the 
bias in the regional data that we described in the previous section, we chose BBN
-h-r as the most 
parsimonious representation of the data. We use this model in all further analysis. 
 
Logistic regression 
The biosecurity practices that were associated (p<0.1) with presence of disease were: Proximity 
of other commercial pig holdings, Procedure for admitting visiting vehicles and Method of 
dealing with spilt feed. The logistic regression model was statistically significant, (Ȥ2 =23.4, 
df=6, p<0.001; The Hosmer Lemeshow Goodness of fit test indicated that the model fit the data 
(Ȥ2= 1.91, p=0.96). Farms were less likely to have a disease outbreak when the distance to the 
nearest neighbouring pig holding was more than 3km. Farms within 1 to 3km of a neighbour 
were 4 times more likely to have disease. Farms were less likely to have disease when visiting 
vehicles were allowed to enter the peripheral zone (compared to not allowed). They were also 
less likely to have disease when spilt feed was cleaned up and fed to the pigs, rather than cleaned 
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up and disposed of immediately or not immediately). The accuracy (70%) was slightly greater 
than that of BBN
-h-r (65%), while the f-measures were similar (0.630 and 0.637 respectively).  
 
BBN scenario analysis: influence of biosecurity practices independently on probability of 
disease 
 
The BBN
-h-r was explored by changing the state of each node (set to 100%) in turn and recording 
the probability of disease (Table 3). For instance, in the steady state, the probability of disease 
was 15% PRRS, 20% SI, 8% MP, 4% SD and 53% ND; while if the nearest pig farm was within 
1km then the probability of disease became 18% PRRS, 31% SI, 8% MP, 3% SD and 40% ND. 
We express this in Table 3 as the RR compared to the steady state of each disease. In the table 
we highlight RR of 1.5 or more and 0.5 or less to demonstrate the biosecurity practices that had 
the most influence on disease probability and we focus the description of results on these 
changes.  
 
Compared to the steady state model, a farrow-to-wean farm had an increased probability of 
PRRS, while a farrow-to-finish farm had a decreased probability of PRRS. A finishing farm had 
an increased probability of MP. 
 
The proximity to a neighbouring commercial pig farm influenced the probability of disease. The 
probability of SI increased (RR 1.55) if there was another pig holding within 1km. The RR of SD 
was 1.75 if there was a pig holding or another livestock holding within 1 to 3 km, while the RR 
decreased to 0.75 if the distance was beyond 3km. The probability of PRRS decreased when the 
nearest pig holding or livestock holding was 1-3km away (RR 0.47), or more than 3km away 
(RR 0.60). The RR of ND was 1.32 if the nearest pig holding was more than 3km away. 
 
In some instances the RR of disease increased when it might be expected that there would be a 
decrease; we review the reasons for such counter-intuitive results in our discussion. For example, 
it was found that when visiting vehicles were not allowed to enter the peripheral biosecure area 
(CAZ) the probability of SD and of ND decreased (RR of 0 and 0.43 respectively); however, an 
unexpected result was that PRRS, and SI tended to increase (RR 2.13 and 1.65 respectively). 
Furthermore, if visiting vehicles were allowed after cleaning and disinfection then the probability 
of SI and SD increased, and the RR of PRRS and MP decreased, while there was a small 
decrease in ND.  
 
When there was no minimum specified time interval between farm staff having contact with 
other pigs and then with farm stock, the probability of all diseases and ND did not change. The 
only exception was that SD decreased to 0. However, if the interval was overnight then the RR 
of SD was 2.25 (and the probability of other diseases tended to decrease a little). Note that the 
states of this node did not alter the probability of ND
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When the health status of purchased stock was unknown (as opposed to known), the RR of SD 
increased by 3.75. In contrast, the RR of PRRS was 0.47. The RR of other disease and of ND 
didQ¶WWHQGWRFKDQJHFRQVLGHUDEO\according to this biosecurity practice. 
 
When spilt feed was not cleaned up and disposed of immediately the RR of PRRS and MP was 2 
and 2.13 respectively. If spilt feed was cleaned up and fed to the pigs then there was a reduction 
in the probability of all four diseases, while the probability of ND increased (RR of 1.6). There 
were 18 farms that fed spilt feed to the pigs, although only three reported occurrence of disease 
(PRRS, SI and MP).  
 
Storage of carcasses for disposal outside of the CAZ generated a decreased probability of PRRS 
(RR 0.47). Probability of ND was higher if stored outside of the CAZ than inside. Within the 
CAZ, storage of carcasses in an unsecure place was a lower risk than if stored in a secure place 
for SI. However, note that this surprising result is based on a small sample size of only 14 farms 
(5 occurrences of disease) on which the carcasses were stored in an unsecure area. 
 
If manure or organic waste was brought onto the farm and spread adjacent to the pig barns then 
the RR of PRRS was 2.47 and of SD was 1.5. Other diseases did not alter considerably, although 
the RR of ND was 0.72.  
 
BBN scenario analysis: influence of biosecurity practices in combination on probability of 
disease 
 
A few biosecurity practices that tended to result in the greatest degree of change (increase or 
decrease) in RR for the various diseases were selected, namely: Health status of purchased stock; 
Method of dealing with spilt feed; Method of manure disposal; Whether manure or organic waste 
was brought from other farms onto the farm or spread on land adjacent to the pigs. We generated 
a few scenarios that represent combinations of these biosecurity practices (Table 4) and we use 
the model to illustrate how the probability of disease varies according to each scenario (Figure 
5). Note that these scenarios illustrate the utility of the BBN and that if a detailed dataset were 
available it would be possible to have confidence in more detailed predictions.  
 
For example, under Scenario 1, when the health status of purchased stock is not known, feed is 
cleaned up and fed to pigs, manure is spread adjacent to barns and manure is brought onto the 
farm, the probability of PRRS increases from 15 to 31% (RR of 2.1), MP decreases from 8 to 4% 
(RR of 0.5) and ND decreases from 53% to 41% (RR 0.77). 
 
Alternative strategies (2 and 3) also decrease the probability of ND. Under Scenario 2 the 
probability of of PRRS and MP increased (to 31% (RR 2.1) and 25% (RR 3.2) respectively), 
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while there was little change in the probability of SI and a decrease in the probability of SD. 
When this scenario was altered to allow manure from other farms to be spread on land adjacent 
to the pigs, the greatest risks for disease were PRRS, which increased to 69% (RR 4.6) and MP 
which increased to 12% (RR1.5).  
Scenario 4 could well be considered to be a low risk strategy since the BBN model predicted that 
the probability of ND increased to 85% (RR 1.6), while the probability of PRRS, SI and SD all 
decreased (to 3% (RR 0.2), 4% (RR 0.2) and 1% (RR 0.25) respectively). 
We also investigated the predictions based on Scenario 1 and Scenario 4 (described above) for 
the three different farm types (Figure 6). In general, farrow-to-finish farms were most likely to 
have ND, while farrow-to-wean farms tended to have the highest probability of disease. The 
probability of PRRS and SD tended to increase in Scenario 1, while the probability of SI and MP 
tended to decrease on each farm type. Under Scenario 4 the probability of ND increased for each 
farm type. On farrow-to-wean farms it increased to 74% (RR 2.11), on farrow-to-finish farms to 
91% (RR 1.4) and on finisher farms to 80% (RR 1.63). The probability of all diseases decreased 
for this scenario. 
 
Discussion  
 
BBN model predictions 
We illustrated the utility of a naïve BBN for the Canadian swine industry in the assessment of 
management practices on the probability of disease occurrence. Results indicated that farm type 
influenced the probability of disease, with farrow-to-wean farms most likely to experience 
disease occurrences. Although we excluded information about region from our model, due to 
limitations in the data, it is likely that region has a considerable influence on disease occurrence 
since farm type and management strategies vary between regions. For example, the size of farm 
changes according to region, with Manitoba, Quebec and Saskatchewan having the largest herds 
and BC and the Atlantic provinces the smallest (Brisson, 2014). Unfortunately we were unable 
consider farm size in our analysis because that data was not available. Differences in 
management strategies include movement of animals between provinces: Alberta, Saskatchewan 
and Ontario export pigs to other provinces for slaughter, while BC, Manitoba and Quebec import 
animals from other provinces for slaughter (University of Guelph, 2010).  
 
We included four diseases in the BBN, which were representative of different disease types. In 
general, there are two main types of swine pathogens; those that are introduced mainly through 
direct pig contacts (where animals that are sub-clinically infected with a pathogen are 
unknowingly introduced into a previously uninfected herd); and those that are introduced 
through indirect contact (pathogens that find their way into herds via routes other than animals) 
(Desrosiers, 2011). In general, PRRS and MP can transmit easily by indirect contact, while SD 
and SI tend to be transmitted primarily by direct contact. The aim of our work was to 
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demonstrate the value of a BBN tool, we therefore briefly discuss how our findings compare to 
the transmission dynamics of the diseases studied. 
 
PRRS virus can spread by direct or indirect contact although the majority of cases in Canada (81-
100%) are associated with indirect transmission (Larochelle et al., 2003; Desrosiers, 2004). The 
virus can be detected in saliva, urine, milk and faeces; routes of indirect transmission include via 
fomites (boots, overalls, etc.), farm personnel, transport vehicles and insects. Significant risk 
factors for spread between farms include purchase of animals from herds incubating infection 
(World Organisation for Animal Health, 2008) and proximity to infected neighbouring herds, 
particularly because transmission can occur via aerosol (Otake et al., 2010). Biosecurity 
protocols to reduce the probability of PRRS include sanitation of vehicles, and implementation 
of strategies for personnel/fomite entry (World Organisation for Animal Health, 2008), however 
control programs are frequently unsuccessful at preventing virus introduction (Desrosiers, 2011). 
In our BBN
-h-r, the greatest risk of PRRS was related to when manure was brought onto the farm 
and spread on land adjacent to the pigs. Our model also showed that when the distance to 
neighbouring pig farms was more than 1km, the probability of PRRS decreased compared to 
being within 1km. This is in agreement with studies that have shown that herds located within 
1.5km of a neighbouring pig farm were more likely to be PRRS-positive (Lambert et al., 2010). 
The slightly higher RR at a further distance (RR 1-3km = 0.47, RR >3km = 0.6) is likely due to 
the small sample size of farms that had PRRS within each distance category.  
 
SI is highly contagious and was the most common cause of disease reported in our survey (21 
occurrences). The virus can be introduced into a herd by infected pigs, humans, and other species 
(World Health Organisation, 2010). Biosecurity practices highlighted by our model included 
allowing vehicle access without cleaning or disinfecting and other pig holdings situated within 
1km. 
 
SD incidence in North America was declining following eradication and effective manure 
removal techniques, however, in 2009 it re-emerged in Western Canada (Harding et al., 2013) 
and approximately 50% of farms became infected through contaminated pigs. Other specific 
security breaches are poorly understood, although  exposure to contaminated faeces or manure 
(Harding et al., 2013) and wildlife (Desrosiers, 2011; Harding et al., 2013) are likely 
mechanisms. Increased probability of SD predicted in our model tended to occur when vehicles 
were allowed access to the CAZ, when farm staff had contacted other herds in the past 3 days, 
when the health status of purchased stock was not known and when manure was brought onto the 
farm and spread on land adjacent to the pig barns. SD tends to be a disease of growing pigs and 
this may be one reason why our model indicated an increased risk on farrow-to-finish farms 
compared to finisher farms (note these predictions were based on a limited number of SD cases).  
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MP is not well suited to indirect transmission (Desrosiers, 2011) and there are no reports of this 
disease occurring in species other than swine. Aerosol transmission is likely the main cause of 
cases that are not caused by direct contact (Desrosiers, 2002). Proximity of other pig farms is 
therefore, a risk factor, with the MP pathogen, having been identified in air samples collected 
more than 9km from their source (Otake et al., 2010). Of the nine cases of MP reported in our 
survey, all occurred on farms that were within 10km of another swine farm, while none occurred 
on the 14 farms whose nearest neighbour was more than 10km away. MP can affect pigs early 
after weaning, but more commonly occurs in grower and finisher stages. This is likely why there 
was a higher probability of occurrence on finisher farms in the BBN
-h-r model.  
 
Model design 
Industry-wide quantitative data collected directly from Canadian swine farms was used to 
specify the CPT of each node in the BBN. This is a unique feature of our study because it is rare 
that BBN design is based on directly collected data. Indeed, calculation of the CPT for each node 
KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVµXVXDOO\WKHKDUGHVWSDUWRIWKHPRGHOOLQJSURFHVV¶ (Fenton and Neil, 2013) 
and in most cases published literature or expert opinion are relied upon to approximate CPTs 
(Newton et al., 2007). Although some BBNs have been built by calculating conditional 
probabilities from published odds ratios for risk factors (Otto and Kristensen, 2004), often there 
is insufficient information available for such estimation.  
 
We selected the most important biosecurity factors based on expert judgment. While there may 
be other factors that are relevant to specific diseases or regions of Canada, for instance, we 
believe that using those identified by a range of experts provided a solid starting point. The node 
relating to region of Canada was removed because of the potential biases introduced by level of 
reporting. In particular, there was an under-representation of farms in Ontario (none reporting 
any disease) and an over-representation of farms in BC.  
 
Sensitivity, PPV and f-measure 
We assessed the performance of the BBN by calculating the accuracy, sensitivity, PPV and f-
measure for models that excluded or included information about prior health status and 
geographic region. We also defined the disease prediction of the model using different threshold 
values to account for multiple diseases. The BBN had an accuracy of 65%; a value that is within 
the range reported for other naive BBNs that were designed for disease diagnosis and is 
considered of comparable performance to the optimally efficient diagnostic rule on available data 
(Geenen et al., 2011). In general, choosing a threshold can depend on the use of the model and 
the implications of false positive and/or false negative errors (Marcot et al., 2006). Prior 
information about the health status of the farm did not improve the fit of the model. One reason 
may be that a farm with a history of disease occurrence may have altered its biosecurity practices 
in response to that outbreak. This temporal misalignment between collection of biosecurity data 
and disease outbreak data is one limitation of our study, (indeed any retrospective cross-sectional 
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study), which we are unable to account for. Since it is possible that diseased farms changed their 
biosecurity practices, misclassification of exposure is likely to be differential. This may explain 
some of the contradictory results, although a more robust dataset is required to estimate the 
magnitude of this effect.  
 
BBN structure and correlation of biosecurity practices 
Uncertainty is a common feature associated with emerging disease events. BBNs are particularly 
advantageous in these situations because if the state of one node is unknown, then the BBN can 
still be used to calculate a probability dependent on the known states of other nodes ± i.e. based 
on the evidence available.  This is an important point because although four diseases were 
included in the BBN, the evidence for SD was only based on 4 outbreaks.  
 
Despite this, there are improvements that could be made to the model, particularly if a dataset 
containing more farms was available. More data would allow us to make stronger inference 
about interactions between biosecurity practices, and would give more confidence in predicting 
which scenarios reduce disease occurrence.  
 
Lack of data may have caused some of the counter-intuitive results that we observed. For 
example, we noted that the probability of SD was 0 if there was no minimum specified time 
interval between farm staff contact with other pigs and then with farm stock, but was greater (RR 
was 2.15) if the time interval was overnight. This result occurred because the farms that have no 
specified time interval between contact did not report any cases of SD. Similarly when there was 
no specified time interval between farm staff contact with animals abroad and animals on the 
farm, the probability of PRRS and MP decreased (compared to a time interval of one night or 
more). When the time interval was more than three nights then the probability of SI increased. 
These results reflect the small sample size for these categories. There were 11 farms that 
HPSOR\HGWKHµQRVSHFLILHGWLPHLQWHUYDO´SROLF\DQGQRQHUHSRUWHGDGLVHDVHAnother 
noteworthy counter-intuitive result relates to vehicle access to the CAZ. When vehicle access to 
the CAZ was not allowed, there was an increased probability of PRRS and SI, compared to when 
vehicles were allowed to enter without cleaning or disinfecting. We suggest that the influence of 
this node is likely biased by the fact that the majority of farms included in the survey (n=70) 
allowed vehicle access without cleaning or disinfecting.  
 
Correlation or confounding of biosecurity practices (included in the model or not) could 
contribute to the counter-intuitive results described above. Although we did not formally test for 
correlation between nodes, it is not unreasonable to suggest that some biosecurity practices will 
be dependent on one another. Confounding factors that we were not able to consider include type 
of visiting vehicles (e.g. feed, manure or waste trucks) and methods of pig transport (e.g. 
methods of loading pigs, clean up around loading, method of load out).  Furthermore, the 
frequency of each event is highly relevant. For example, movement of pigs on to a finisher farm 
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is more frequent than onto other farm types, while movement of pigs off farrowing farms is more 
frequent than other farm types (Thakur et al., 2014). It is for this reason that nursery farms have 
been highlighted as targets for disease surveillance (Dorjee et al., 2013).  
 
Here we chose to create a BBN using a naïve structure as a first step in the analysis of the 
relatively complex data. Such a structure is excellent for integrating information while 
maintaining a model of limited size (Gustafson et al., 2005; Needham et al., 2007). Although, 
%%1¶VDWWHPSWWRHQVXUHFRQGLWLRQDOLQGHSHQGHQFHEHWZHHQQRGHVZHGLGQRWassess dependence 
of nodes for this simple model. Despite the underlying independence assumption in a naïve 
BBN, they have proven to be powerful probabilistic models for solving classification problems 
in a variety of domains (Geenen et al., 2011) and have been shown to outperform more 
sophisticated models even for classification problems in which the assumption does not hold 
(Domingos and Pazzani, 1997). Furthermore, in comparison to classical statistical analysis, our 
approach has a number of advantages. The logistic regression only allowed us to assess risk 
factors for presence or absence of disease, while the BBN allowed us to assess the occurrence of 
four different diseases and the impact of biosecurity practices simultaneously. Further, we were 
able to explicitly model causal factors, and we demonstrated how the tool can be used to arrive at 
decisions with visible, auditable reasoning. 
 
Building realistic and accurate BBNs with a proper graphical structure and all the required CPTs 
remains a major challenge (Zhou et al., 2014). Ongoing analysis (not presented here) aims to 
account for dependence among nodes in order to tease apart the complex interactions of 
biosecurity practices. This includes revising the BBN by creating influence diagrams of the 
causal web (e.g. Marcot et al. (2006)). We have also been using machine learning to explore 
network structures and to improve model fit (Cox et al., 2015).  
 
Potential use of the Swine BBN 
While there are some limitations to the current BBN, we have presented a method that is robust 
and we believe that anomalous results would likely be resolved by the collection of additional 
data. Our BBN provides a visual tool that allowed us to carry out an interactive assessment of 
biosecurity practices on the RR of disease occurrence. Importantly, such a BBN can be readily 
updated as new evidence becomes available, which means that it provides a ready-made platform 
which can be modified as new threats emerge and/or working practices in the Canadian pork 
industry are revised.  
 
Demonstrating the possible means by which a given pathogen can be introduced into swine herds 
is a necessary step in understanding its epidemiology, while being able to weigh the significance 
of each of these means is crucial (Desrosiers, 2011). Thus we suggest a number of end users of a 
BBN model. On a small scale, this type of tool could be  used by industry and vets within a 
province to create farm-specific risk profiles. On a wider scale, it could contribute to improving 
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industry biosecurity practices nationally. At present, surveillance for swine endemic diseases 
occurs at a provincial level in Canada. An improvement to this system could be collation of farm 
data, along with laboratory and slaughterhouse data, by a coordinating body such as the CSHB. 
Creation of such a veterinary network and collation of syndromic data would enable the 
&DQDGLDQLQGXVWU\¶Vmission of re-focusing efforts in animal health on a national basis. If such 
data existed then a BBN model could become a fundamental tool for identifying and monitoring 
pathogen threats.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 Number of commercial farms included in the CSHB biosecurity survey per region 
of Canada and number of responders to the disease occurrence questionnaire. 
 
 Farm Type 
 Farrow-to-wean Farrow-to-finish Finisher Total 
Region No. farms No. 
responders 
(%) 
No. 
farms 
No. 
responders 
(%) 
No. 
farms 
No. 
responders 
(%) 
No. 
farms 
No. 
responders 
(%) 
BC 1 1(100) 16 15 (94) 3 3 (100) 20 19 (95) 
Prairies 21 5 (24) 26 7 (27) 24 4 (17) 71 16 (8) 
Ontario 14 0 (0) 17 3 (18) 21 5 (24) 52 8 (15) 
Quebec 16 9 (56) 10 5 (50) 22 15 (68) 42 29 (69) 
Maritimes 9 3 (33) 13 10 (77) 5 5 (100) 27 18 (67) 
Total 61 18 (30) 82 40 (49) 75 32 (43) 218 90 (41) 
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Table 2 The health status of 90 Canadian commercial swine farms in 2010 and the 
occurrence of disease between January 2010 and December 2011.  
 
A. The health status of commercial swine farms in 2010 when the CSHB biosecurity survey 
was conducted 
Disease Naïve Positive  Stable No testing 
Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS) 43 15 25 7 
Swine Influenza (SI) 38 12 15 25 
Mycoplasma Pneumonia (MP) 34 19 29 8 
Swine Dysentery (SD) 58 3 2 27 
Transmissible Gastro-Entiritis (TGE) 71 0 0 19 
Pleuropneumonia (APP) 62 2 8 18 
Definitions: 
Naïve: the pathogen has been looked for (by observation and testing) but has never been detected 
on this farm. 
Positive: The animals on the farm are known to be clinically infected with the pathogen. 
Stable: The animals are serologically positive (natural or vaccinated), however there are no 
clinical signs. 
No testing: No testing has been done.  
 
B The number of occurrences of disease on 90 farms between January 2010 and December 
2011. 
Disease Yes No 
Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS) 16 74 
Swine Influenza (SI) 21 69 
Mycoplasma Pneumonia (MP) 9 81 
Swine Dysentery (SD) 4 86 
Transmissible Gastro-Entiritis (TGE) 0 90 
Pleuropneumonia (APP) 1 89 
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Table 3 The steady state of BBN
-p-r and the impact of each biosecurity practice on the 
relative risk of each disease.  
The first row shows the probability of each disease and of no disease when no evidence has 
been entered into the model. Entries in each row show the RR of disease compared to the 
steady state model if that state is selected. An increase in disease probability with a RR of more 
than 1.5 is highlighted in red; a decreased disease probability with a RR of less than 0.5 is 
highlighted in blue.  
 
Risk factor Disease 
 PRRS SI MP SD ND 
No Evidence: steady state 15% 20% 8% 4% 53% 
Farm type      
Farrow-to-wean 1.73 1.30 1.13 1.00 0.66 
Farrow-to-finish 0.47 0.95 0.63 1.25 1.23 
Finisher 1.20 0.90 1.63 0.75 0.92 
Proximity of other  commercial pig holdings      
Nearest pig holding < 1km 1.20 1.55 1.00 0.75 0.75 
Nearest pig holding 1-3km 0.47 0.70 0.88 1.75 1.23 
Nearest pig holding >3km 0.60 0.60 0.75 0.75 1.32 
Proximity of other holdings with livestock other than pigs (including slaughterhouses, hobby farms and sale 
barns) 
Nearest other livestock holding <1km 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.00 0.96 
Nearest other livestock holding 1-3km 0.47 0.70 0.88 1.75 1.23 
Nearest other livestock holding >3km 1.60 0.60 1.50 0.25 0.96 
Proximity of the nearest poultry farm      
Nearest poultry farm < 1km 0.80 1.10 0.75 0.75 1.08 
Nearest poultry farm 1-3 km 1.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.96 
Nearest poultry farm  >3km 0.80 1.10 1.25 1.00 0.98 
Procedure for admitting visiting vehicles      
Visiting vehicle access allowed without cleaning and/or disinfection. 0.93 0.80 1.13 1.00 1.09 
Visiting vehicle access allowed with cleaning and/or disinfection. 0.47 1.90 0.13 2.00 0.87 
None allowed to enter the peripheral biosecure area (CAZ). 2.13 1.65 1.38 0.00 0.43 
Minimum specified time interval that must elapse between farm staff having contact with other pigs and then 
with farm stock 
No interval specified 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.09 
Overnight 0.60 0.90 0.50 2.25 1.13 
2 or more nights 1.13 0.85 1.25 0.75 1.00 
Not applicable 1.33 1.30 1.25 1.25 0.72 
Minimum specified time interval that must elapse between farm staff having contact with animals abroad / 
imported animals and then with farm stock 
None 0.07 0.85 0.13 2.25 1.36 
<3 nights 0.53 0.10 1.00 2.00 1.40 
3 or more nights 0.07 2.05 0.63 1.25 0.91 
Not applicable 1.53 0.85 1.38 0.50 0.89 
Employee policy prohibits the introduction of meat (cooked or uncooked) products 
No or No policy 1.07 0.90 1.00 0.50 1.06 
Yes 0.13 1.95 1.25 5.00 0.57 
Health status of purchased stock is known*      
No or Vague 0.47 0.75 0.88 3.75 1.02 
Yes 1.07 1.05 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Method of dealing with spilt feed*      
Cleaned up and fed to pigs 0.33 0.25 0.63 0.00 1.60 
Not cleaned up and not disposed of immediately 2.00 1.10 2.13 0.00 0.58 
Cleaned up and disposed of immediately 0.80 1.20 0.75 1.50 0.96 
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Method of carcass storage      
Inside the CAZ, not secure from vermin, scavengers and pests. 1.20 0.30 1.50 1.50 1.08 
Inside the CAZ, secure from vermin, scavengers and pests. 1.27 1.35 0.88 0.00 0.91 
Outside of the CAZ, not secure from vermin, scavengers and pests 0.47 0.75 0.88 2.00 1.17 
Outside of the CAZ, secure from vermin, scavengers and pests. 0.60 0.95 1.13 1.50 1.06 
Method of manure disposal*      
Spread (treated or untreated) adjacent to pig barns 0.87 1.05 0.88 1.00 1.06 
Spread (treated or untreated) away from pig barns. 1.40 0.85 1.63 1.00 0.83 
Manure or organic waste from other farms are brought onto the farm and spread on land adjacent to the pigs* 
Yes 2.47 0.65 0.75 1.50 0.72 
No 0.73 1.05 1.13 0.75 1.06 
Biosecurity measures are maintained in an emergency      
No 1.13 0.80 1.25 0.75 1.04 
Yes 0.73 1.40 0.75 1.50 0.92 
*These biosecurity practices were used in our demonstration of how the BBN can be employed 
to assess a combination of practices on the probability of disease 
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Table 4 Four different scenarios, which represent combinations of biosecurity practices. 
Scenarios were simulated in the BBN and the resulting probability of disease for each 
scenario presented in figure 5. 
Biosecurity practices Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Health status of purchased 
stock is known 
No or vague No or vague No or vague Yes 
Method of dealing with spilt 
feed 
Cleaned up and fed 
to pigs 
Not cleaned up 
and not disposed 
of immediately 
Not cleaned up 
and not disposed 
of immediately 
Cleaned up and 
disposed of 
immediately 
Method of manure disposal Spread (treated or 
untreated) adjacent 
to pig barns 
Spread (treated or 
untreated) away 
from pig barns 
Spread (treated or 
untreated) away 
from pig barns 
Spread (treated or 
untreated) away 
from pig barns 
Manure or organic waste 
from other farms are brought 
onto the farm and spread on 
land adjacent to the pigs 
Yes No Yes No 
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Figure 1 Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) constructed to examine the probability of occurrence of four diseases on commercial 
swine farms in Canada.  
The central disease node (yellow) was connected to all other nodes via conditional probabilities. Within each node, the possible states 
(left hand side of the node) and the corresponding probability of each state is shown as a percentage and by the coloured bars. The 
QRGHWRVZLWFKEHWZHHQµQRhistory¶DQGµhistory¶LVVKRZQRQWKHULJKWKDQGVLGHDQGLQWKLVH[DPSOHLVVZLWFKHGµRII¶7KLVfigure 
UHSUHVHQWVWKH³VWHDG\VWDWH´of BBN
-h. 
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Figure 2 Accuracy of the BBN (percentage of correctly classified outcomes) at increasing 
values of disease node status threshold.  The BBN predicted outcome (i.e. disease occurrence) 
was the disease status that exceeded the threshold value. Data points that are not joined by the 
line show the accuracy when the BBN prediction was the disease status with the highest 
percentage.  
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Figure 3 BBN predicted number of outcomes at increasing values of disease node status 
threshold.  The BBN predicted disease outcome was the disease status that exceeded the 
threshold value. Data points that are not joined by the line, show the number of outcomes, when 
the BBN prediction was the disease status with the highest percentage. (In this case all models 
predicted one outcome per scenario and therefore predicted 105 outcomes in total, because there 
were 105 outcomes in the real dataset). 
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Figure 4 F-measure of the BBN at increasing values of disease node status threshold.  The 
BBN predicted disease outcome was the disease status that exceeded the threshold value. Data 
points that are not joined by the line, show the f-measure when the BBN prediction was the 
disease status with the highest percentage. 
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Figure 5 Assessment of a combination of biosecurity practices on the probability of disease 
occurrence. 7KHILUVWOLQHVKRZVWKHGLVHDVHVWDWHZLWKRXWHYLGHQFHLHµVWHDG\VWDWH¶2WKHU
lines show the disease state under four different scenarios, which represent a different 
combination of biosecurity practices, as described in table 4.  
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Figure 6 Assessment of a combination of biosecurity practices on the probability of disease occurrence on three different swine 
farm types.  
The first line shows the disease state without evidence. Other lines show the disease state under two different scenarios (as described 
in table 4). 
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
Table S1 Biosecurity practices that were included in the BBN that occurred on a total of 90 
commercial swine farms in Canada in 2010.  
Each biosecurity practice (grey) is represented by a node in the BBN and the associated states of 
the node (white) are shown underneath.  
 
Biosecurity practice or farm feature Number of 
farms  
 n % 
Region of Canada   
BC 19 21 
Prairies 16 18 
Ontario 8 9 
Quebec 29 32 
Maritimes 18 20 
Farm type   
Farrow-to-wean  18 20 
Farrow-to-finish  40 44 
Finisher  32 36 
Proximity of other commercial pig holdings   
Nearest pig holding < 1km 30 33 
Nearest pig holding 1-3km 29 32 
Nearest pig holding 3-10km1 17 19 
Nearest pig holding >10km1 14 16 
Proximity of other holdings with livestock other than pigs (including slaughterhouses, hobby farms 
and sale barns) 
  
Fields adjacent and used for cloven hoofed animals other than pigs1 34 28 
Fields adjacent and used for other (non-cloven hoofed) animals1 5 6 
Livestock holding nearby has cloven hoofed animals other than pigs but adjacent fields not used1 15 17 
Livestock holding nearby has non-cloven-hoofed animals only and adjacent fields not used1 0 0 
Nearest other livestock holding <1km1 16 18 
Nearest other livestock holding 1-3km 13 14 
Nearest other livestock holding 3-10km2 4 4 
Nearest other livestock holding >10km2 3 3 
Proximity of the nearest poultry farm   
Nearest poultry farm < 1km 27 33 
Nearest poultry farm 1-3 km 20 22 
Nearest poultry farm 3-10 km1 20 22 
Nearest poultry farm  >10km1 23 26 
Procedure for admitting visiting vehicles   
No action taken - visiting vehicles have access but no cleaning or disinfection 70 78 
Visiting vehicles allowed and disinfection procedures used but without cleaning1 3 33 
Visiting vehicles allowed in but good cleaning and disinfection procedures used1 2 22 
Visiting vehicle access is kept to the minimum - cleaning and disinfection procedures used1 6 7 
None allowed to enter the peripheral biosecure area (CAZ), boundary transfer only 9 10 
Employee policy prohibits the introduction of meat (cooked or uncooked) products   
No1 47 52 
No policy1 35 29 
Yes 8 89 
Minimum specified time interval that must elapse between farm staff having contact with other pigs 
and then with farm stock 
  
No interval specified 30 33 
Overnight 21 23 
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2 nights1 19 21 
3 or more nights1 6 7 
Not applicable 14 16 
Minimum specified time interval that must elapse between farm staff having contact with animals 
abroad / imported animals and then with farm stock 
  
None 11 12 
<3 nights 12 13 
3-5 nights1 9 10 
5 or more nights1 9 10 
Not applicable 49 55 
Health status of purchased stock is known   
No knowledge1 5 6 
Vague1 7 7 
Yes 78 87 
Method of dealing with spilt feed   
Cleaned up and fed to pigs 18 20 
Not cleaned up and disposed of immediately 16 18 
Cleaned up and disposed of immediately 56 62 
Frequency with which carcasses are removed from pens*   
Carcasses are not removed from pens within a day and stored away from other stock and vermin 0 0 
Carcasses are removed from pens within a day and stored away from other stock and vermin 91 100 
Method of carcass storage   
Inside the CAZ, not secure from vermin, scavengers and pests 14 16 
Inside the CAZ, secure from vermin, scavengers and pests 36 40 
Outside of the CAZ, not secure from vermin, scavengers and pests 12 13 
Outside of the CAZ, secure from vermin, scavengers and pests 28 31 
Method of manure disposal   
Manure is spread, untreated, on land that is adjacent to pig barns1 67 74 
Manure is treated (composted), prior to spreading on land adjacent to pig barns1 4 4 
Manure is spread untreated on land that is away from pig barns2 17 49 
Manure is treated (composted) prior to spreading on land that is away from pig barns2 2 2 
Not applicable2 0 0 
Manure from other farms are brought onto the farm and spread on land adjacent to the pigs   
Only animal manure for soil fertility building purposes that is sufficiently treated before spreading1 2 2 
Untreated animal manure or organic waste1 11 12 
No 77 86 
Biosecurity measures are maintained in an emergency   
No 60 67 
Yes 30 33 
When there were four or more states for a biosecurity practice, some states were merged where 
biologically possible. This was done to increase the sample size and to simplify calculation of the 
conditional probabilities in the BBN. 1and 2 indicate the states within a node that were merged 
into one state, i.e. all states assigned 1 were merged together within the node and all states 
assigned 2 were merged together within the same node.  
*This biosecurity practice was excluded because all farms removed carcasses within a day.  
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Figure S1 Questionnaire used to collect information about health status and disease 
occurrence on Canadian swine farms. 
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Figure S2 Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) constructed using a naïve Bayes approach, to 
examine the probability of disease occurrence on swine farms in Canada.  
 
